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TROUBLING QUESTIONS: A REVIEW OF 
THE .DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE 
I.DEAL 
Sheldon L. Messinger* 
THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND 
SOCIAL PURPOSE. By Francis A. Allen. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press. 1981. Pp. xii, 132. $15. 
I 
At the height of its dominance over recommendations for research on 
penal treatment, Francis A. Allen made three bold assertions about the re-
habilitative ideal. 1 First, the ideal had functioned to narrow criminological 
scholarship. Beguiled by whether penal treatment had achieved the ideal, 
scholars had neglected to ask other, more important questions, questions 
with respect to the exercise of state power to criminalize conduct, and ques-
tions about the achievement of other criminal justice aims, like deterrence. 
Second, the ideal had served to mask hypocrisy and oppression. Hard 
treatment was renamed "therapy" and few noticed; treatment that could 
not be justified as punishment was warranted as "therapeutic." Finally, at-
titudes encouraged by the ideal sometimes supported penal measures that 
threatened liberty and personhood. Under the dazzling lights of the reha-
bilitative vision and experts' claims to know how to realize that vision, laws 
were enacted and practices countenanced that imperiled basic political 
values. 
A considerable indictment, Allen's essay has since served to disturb and 
enlighten successive generations of students of criminal law and justice -
and, hopefully, a few law makers and practitioners as well. Its message was 
loud and clear: the rehabilitative claims of penal authorities are not to be 
taken at face value. The announcement of benevolence, however often re-
peated, may cover harshness, neglect, even malevolence. Crime and crimi-
nal justice are political matters of greatest import. Be wary: the 
rehabilitative claims of officials had justified their exercise of considerable 
unstructured, unchecked discretion, and the discretion of state officials may 
be, and on the evidence often is, misused. 
In The JJ.ec/ine of the Rehabilitative Ideal, Allen returns to survey the 
territory twenty years later. Now, criminological scholarship has become 
less narrow if, in some respects, no sounder. Hypocrisy and oppression 
have been decried, even if not fully routed. The rehabilitative vision had 
• Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Ph.D. 1969, University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles. - Ed. 
l. See Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, SO J. CRIM, L., CRIMI· 
NOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 226 (1959). 
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been blurred by 1979, when the lectures on which these essays are based 
were given. Experts' claims, if no less plentiful, are viewed now with con-
siderable skepticism. Liberty and personhood remain threatened, but by 
other forces and ideals - or by the absence of commanding ideals. How to 
assure personal liberty and a decent respect for the autonomy of persons 
remains a central concern for Allen. But the most salient threats now ap-
pear to be escalating dissension and a loss of faith in the capacity of our 
social institutions to accomplish public purposes. The deterioration of the 
rehabilitative ideal of criminal justice is both a sign and a part of this dis-
sension and disillusionment. And a significant risk is that, reacting to such 
deterioration and loss of faith, we shall deny sufficient discretion to state 
officials to permit fashioning new purposes or moving toward their 
accomplishment. 
II 
Allen's volume contains three essays and a brief epilogue. First he un-
dertakes to account for the decline of the rehabilitative ideal in terms that 
point to broader changes in the United States, cultural shifts of wider im-
port. He next canvasses current criticism of the ideal with a view to grasp-
ing "the assumptions on which contemporary efforts to recast criminal 
justice are based" (p. 32). Then he speculates about the direction that crim-
inal justice policy might take in the future and, particularly, the role that 
the rehabilitative ideal might play in influencing a new policy. Finally, Al-
len identifies a central risk engendered by current efforts to redirect crimi-
nal justice policy. 
First, then, why the weakening of the grip of the rehabilitative ideal? 
Allen reasons that to answer this question requires understanding the con-
ditions facilitating the rise and dominance of the ideal in criminal justice. 
What are these? He offers two broad propositions. First, the ideal is likely 
to arise and persist in societies that strongly believe in the malleability of 
human character and behavior. Because this seems almost tautological (the 
ideal itself posits such change as possible), he offers a supplementary propo-
sition: what counts is confidence in the capacity of social institutions to 
effect desired changes in character and behavior. A second cultural requi-
site is a working consensus about what it means to be rehabilitated, suffi-
cient consensus "on the distinction between the malady and the cure" (p. 
11). Societies whose cultures meet these conditions will experience the rise 
and persistence of the rehabilitative ideal. When these conditions are no 
longer met, the ideal will decline. 
Allen illustrates these propositions in two ways. First, he examines the 
pre-Civil War United States and contemporary China as examples of socie-
ties in which the conditions are met, and the rehabilitative ideal rises and 
persists. Both societies, he says, exhibit considerable faith in human malle-
ability, the capacity of social institutions positively to affect it, and sufficient 
consensus on the aims of treatment. Broader cultural differences between 
the pre-Civil War United States and modem China doubtless make a dif-
ference in the actual content of the rehabilitative ideal and its practical real-
izations, although there are, he notes, striking similarities. Still, in Allen's 
judgment, the propositions seem to hold - and to be enlightening. All of 
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this and more is said in a very few pages, too few to make more than a 
suggestive case. 
At greater length, Allen describes our own society as an example of how 
loss of confidence in social institutions, and diminishing consensus about 
the appropriate treatment of criminals, leads to a decline of the rehabilita-
tive ideal. But it is well to note that Allen is not arguing that skepticism 
about the rehabilitative ideal is unique to the modem United States. He 
recognizes a point made forcefully by Michel Foucault: that criticism of the 
rehabilitative ideal was born with the ideal itself.2 What is distinctive about 
the contemporary situation, according to Allen, is the consensus now to be 
found, particularly among intellectuals, about the disutility, and even injus-
tice, of pursuing the rehabilitative ideal in penal policy - or, at least, of 
making the ideal dominant. Radical criminologists, individual rights phi-
losophers, egalitarians, supporters of more stringent regulation of govern-
ment, and law-and-order devotees have all had nasty things to say about 
this pursuit. Even empirically oriented social scientists have made their 
contribution. But as Allen points out, such criticism is part of the phenome-
non to be explained, not part of the explanation for the decline of the ideal.3 
So what explains it? In Allen's view, the cultural supports for the ideal 
have collapsed, eroded by a confluence of events including the Vietnam 
War, the civil rights movement, and Watergate. We no longer believe that 
our central socializing institutions work or can be trusted. We cannot agree 
on what they should work to accomplish. Thus, there has been a loss of 
faith in the family as an authoritative site for the shaping of character and 
behavior in socially productive ways. Schools are seen as failing institu-
tions. Even belief in therapy has crumbled, or evolved to support the pur-
suit of personal satisfactions, not public purposes. Part and parcel of the 
same shift of attitudes, penal treatment has come to be seen as both ineffec-
tive and politically suspect. There is no longer agreement on the proper 
aims of treatment. Considerable disagreement has surfaced about the 
criminalization of certain forms of behavior - homosexuality, abortion. 
Even violence is defended by some groups. The criminal justice system has 
been deeply affected by cultural changes beyond its ken or control. Crime 
has increased since World War II, particularly crime by nonwhite males. 
The reformers and the reformed are increasingly alienated from each other, 
leading both to question the wisdom and possibility of pursuing a rehabili-
tative ideal of penal treatment. 
In his second essay, Allen reviews contemporary criticism of the rehabil-
itative ideal. If it doesn't account for the ideal's decline, it is still worth 
examining to discover assumptions that may affect the future direction of 
criminal justice. What are these criticisms and assumptions? 
First and most important, the rehabilitative ideal can pose a threat to 
fundamental political values. It can serve to mask repression, blunting jus-
tified protests and encouraging procedural laxity. Allen, of course, was 
2. M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 264-68 (A. Sheri-
dan trans. 1977). 
3. See the remarkable review of early criticism of the inhumanity of total institutions in A. 
SCULL, DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT - A RADICAL Vrnw 
95-119 (1973). 
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among the first to voice this criticism. Now he thinks criticism may have 
gone too far and become too strident and crude, too ideological. It is im-
portant nonetheless to see, he concludes, that such criticism points to a ten-
sion between the rehabilitative ideal and liberal political values. The 
former calls for increased state discretion, the latter for checks on state 
power. The crucial issue now is how these can be reconciled. 
Second, critics have exposed the vulnerability of the rehabilitative ideal 
to "debasement," to being used to justify activities not truly aimed at reha-
bilitation. Again, a criticism made earlier and well by Allen. Now, he sug-
gests, the task is to appreciate the inherent vulnerability of the ideal to 
debasement and, presumably, to stay on guard. The ends proposed by the 
ideal are vague, the means to its realization uncertain; both may be perma-
nent features of the ideal. Given these facts, administrators, pressed to real-
ize other ends, will be sorely tempted to co-opt "rehabilitative" programs, 
and find it relatively easy to do so. Rehabilitative devotees, intent on prov-
ing their worth, may be tempted to promise too much and corrupt their 
programs in an effort to seem to deliver. The problems are plentiful and 
enduring. Allen's message is that they are no reason for complete abandon-
ment of rehabilitative efforts. 
Finally, it may be that we simply do not have the knowledge requisite 
for successful rehabilitation. Allen clearly believes that this has been the 
case most of the time. Again, however, the lesson he draws is one of moder-
ation: this is not a reason for complete abandonment of rehabilitative ef-
forts. Above all, it is not a reason to stop studying the problem of 
rehabilitation and tools for achieving it. 
What, then, about the future? What are the options among the contend-
ers for the dominant penal ideal, now that rehabilitation is no longer via-
ble? This is the topic of Allen's third essay. There is, of course, the war-on-
crime theory, which always presses to increase repression. Allen finds the 
theory morally bankrupt, and impractical as well. It is unlikely, in his judg-
ment, to achieve general acceptance. In the meantime, as always, it will 
limit positive accomplishments of all sorts. Then there is the radical theory, 
but this seems less a theory of penal reform to Allen than a wish for revolu-
tion.4 A liberal theory also exists, but it, like the radical theory, contains 
few prescriptions for penal reform; it calls, instead, for broader reforms that 
will prevent crime. This leaves older ideas competing for dominance: just 
deserts (retribution), deterrence, incapacitation. What are their chances of 
becoming the dominant ideal? 
First, just deserts. Allen begins by considering why retributive theory is 
currently so popular, having long been a kind of whipping boy for intellec-
tuals. Just deserts, he suggests, serves to "reaffirm the reality of moral val-
ues at a time when much in contemporary thought appears to challenge the 
concept of moral as well as legal responsibility" (p. 67). It counsels restrict-
ing the discretion of officials just when government authority is being ques-
tioned. It comports well with philosophies stressing individual rights and 
the importance of human volition, philosophies gaining popularity just 
4. Allen insightfully notes that it is unclear that radical criminologists oppose the rehabili-
tative ideal even in its more coercive actualizations. It is "rather that the wrong values are 
imposed" by the rehabilitative efforts of the states they are criticizing. P. 452 n.3. 
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when the viability of the first and reality of the second are in serious doubt. 
And it expresses, in some of its forms, a strong aspiration for equality dear 
to much of the population - dearer yet, perhaps, because of the apparent 
slowness of its coming. 
The popularity of just deserts theory, briefly, is in important part a re-
sponse to the forces accounting for the decline of the rehabilitative ideal -
loss of faith in authority, loss of consensus about guiding values. When 
these troubles diminish, so will the popularity of just deserts theory. Still, it 
will survive, influencing any emergent criminal justice policy because it ex-
presses now, as in the past, a basic moral intuition: no punishment unless 
merited. At the same time, it will not dominate a new penal policy. There 
are too many competing questions and values. Are individuals autonomous 
and should they always be treated as if they were? Can justice be realized 
in a society like ours - is a just theory, full-blown, justifiable in such a 
society? Will such a theory satisfy demands for community protection? 
And: what is blameworthy? 
Just deserts theory, then, will survive and contribute to any emerging 
policy, but it will not dominate. The idea of "commensurate penalties," 
central to the theory, is at least as vague as the idea of "rehabilitation," 
which is one reason why enlightened persons might oppose its domination. 
It can, however, point to the need to put limits on punishment, and to the 
wisdom of ordering punishments according to the culpability of offenders. 
Thus it can help contain state power, at least by pointing up the need for 
and the justice of containment. But other values - deterrence, incapacita-
tion, even parsimony-will compete for influence over decisions within the 
limits that just deserts theory will help to establish. 
A modem synthesis, according to Allen, will be eclectic. This view 
seems to be in part a prediction, in light of the lack of consensus Allen has 
traced, and in part a recommendation. A modem synthesis should honor 
just deserts as a principle for containing state power. Equality of treatment 
should be respected, by requiring "affirmative showings of substantial so-
cial advantage" (p. 76) if it is to be violated - and such violations should 
take place only within the boundaries of deserved punishment. Discretion 
should be controlled and not eliminated. Guidelines for decision-makers 
should be provided, and provisions made to review their decisions. 
Deterrence and incapacitation are scarcely mentioned as contenders for 
the dominant principle. They are not "sufficient . . . to determine all as-
pects of modem penal policy . . . and each . . . must at some point be 
countered by other principles" (p. 76). 
What of the rehabilitative ideal? It should continue to play a role in any 
new policy. There are two reasons to think it will. Rehabilitative programs 
will be seen as needed for some who cannot easily be treated as autono-
mous. Further, and less happily, politicians will continue to legislate "reha-
bilitative" programs when they do not know what else to do. It should 
continue to influence penal policy, in any case, to combat prisonization 
(prisons will continue to be used) and as a component of community correc-
tions programs. Whatever the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs, they 
should be furnished as a moral necessity, part of the state's obligation to 
facilitate prisoners' aspirations for knowledge and growth. 
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Finally, in his epilogue, Allen turns to a major concern, one that has 
influenced his thinking on the many problems discussed in this volume. An 
important source of the modem withdrawal from the rehabilitative ideal is 
suspicion of authority. As a practical matter this means opposition to offi-
cial discretion - moves, as in various "determinate" sentencing laws, to 
structure and limit discretionary decision-making. Allen wants to warn 
against overzealousness in the attempt to tie officials' hands. Discretion 
cannot be abolished in the governance of human affairs. But it can be 
transferred and it can be hidden. One risk is that the recipients of trans-
ferred discretion may be even less competent than its original holders. An-
other is that checking the results of the exercise of discretion will become 
even more difficult. Discretion will always be with us; the task is to tame it. 
To attempt to restrict it too severely is to risk being unable to accomplish 
any public purposes at all. 
III 
In sum: the rehabilitative ideal has dominated thinking and discourse 
about penal treatment, especially among intellectuals, in the United States 
since shortly after the birth of the Republic. In the 1960s and 1970s it suf-
fered a precipitous decline. This decline reflects the deterioration of the 
cultural assumptions which sustained it: belief that human character and 
conduct can be shaped by social institutions in ways that serve public pur-
poses, and agreement about those purposes. Criticism of the rehabilitative 
ideal is widespread. Such criticism suggests some ideas that might usefully 
inform any new penal policy. Claims that penal treatment is rehabilitative 
should be viewed with skepticism: such claims may mask repressive action; 
they may leave penal programs particularly vulnerable to being put to 
other, less acceptable uses; they may be unfounded. Still, those who shape 
policy must be careful not to go too far, not to abandon completely and for 
all types of offenders the effort to rehabilitate, not to stop inquiring into 
means for rehabilitation and their efficacy. A new penal policy will not 
emerge easily, given extant distrust and dissension. Law-and-order advo-
cates, radicals, even liberals have little to offer. The new policy will doubt-
less - and rightly - reflect older aspirations for justice, equality, and 
community protection, and even fiscal restraint will have a place. Ways 
must be found - perhaps this is the main lesson - to guide and check the 
discretion of those who mete out criminal justice. But these ways must not 
so bind officials' hands that no coherent public purposes can emerge in this 
field or be effectively pursued. 
IV 
The decline of the rehabilitative ideal, like other political upheavals of 
the 1960s, caught most scholars unawares. Allen's is one of the first efforts 
to make sense of what appears to many to be the beginning of a major 
change in thinking about penal treatment and in recommendations for its 
reform. Whether the change will prove as important as many, including 
Allen, believe, remains to be seen. So, too, does the exact character of the 
change, including, particularly, its consequences for penal treatment, as op-
posed to discourse about it. 
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Will the change be as thoroughgoing as that which overtook penal treat-
ment in the United States and elsewhere at about the tum of the nineteenth 
century, when prisons, ostensibly devoted to reforming their captive popu-
lations, first came into widespread use for punishment?5 The social sources 
and meaning of that change currently are the subjects of intensive scholarly 
debate, triggered, perhaps, by a sense that the results of the change are 
themselves about to pass from the societal stage. It is that lengthy era dur-
ing which the rehabilitative ideal dominated the recommendations of re-
formers and, later, the research agendas of social scientists. It is that era, 
too, about which many now conclude that rehabilitation was as much, if not 
more, an ideological screen for hard treatment especially directed to minor-
ities as it was a genuine aspiration closely linked to humanitarian impulses. 
Allen was among the first to point this out. 
In this volume, he is more concerned to point out the risks associated 
with the new ideals that may replace that of rehabilitation. He contends, in 
essence, that we are in danger that new ideals may function as ideologies, 
limiting vision and deflecting criticism. If too exclusively or zealously pur-
sued they may cause neglect of other important aims of criminal justice, 
eventually engendering a reaction that may itself cause needless damage to 
important social goals. We must attend carefully to all the functions we 
would have penal treatment achieve. We should not permit a single goal to 
dominate our vision of proper penal policy as some have in the past. We 
should learn a lesson from our experience with the dominance of the reha-
bilitative ideal. 
As noted above, Allen examines only one competing alternative to the 
rehabilitative ideal at all carefully: retribution or just deserts. He is correct, 
I think, in pointing to the sources of the current popularity of just deserts 
theory. It provides a promise of redress for many of the losses we feel we 
are suffering; it is in part an effort to stem a felt tide of deterioration of 
public purpose and morality.6 This is not all that is involved, and Allen 
remarks on this as well. His cautions about the risks of exclusive pursuit of 
a retributive penal policy are also well-taken. 
I wish that he had as carefully analyzed the other contenders for domi-
nant ideal - particularly incapacitation. At least two recent treatises have 
recommended it.7 One has suggested how it might contribute not only to 
5. Four of the best recent studies of the emergence of prisons and the change in penal 
philosophy accompanying the rise are M. FOUCAULT, supra note 2 (discussing French penal 
system); M. IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: THE PENITENTIARY IN THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION 1750-1850 (1978) (discussing English penal system); D. MELOSSI & M. PAVARINI, 
THE PRISON AND THE FACTORY: ORIGINS OF THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM (1981) (Italian and 
American penal systems); D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER 
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (1971) (origins of American penal system). 
6. Allen's interpretation is reminiscent of Joseph R. Gusfield's discussion of the meaning 
of the prohibition movement. See J. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE (1963). Prohibition was a 
"symbolic crusade" to preserve a set of values felt to be threatened by another set and style of 
life, associated with persons of other (urban, immigrant) origins. The values represented by 
the prohibition movement have themselves declined, after a brief, perhaps final flare. Is some-
thing similar in the offing for •~ust deserts"? Allen doesn't think so, although he doubts that 
retributive values will dominate future penal policy. 
1. See P. GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982); M. SHER• 
MAN & G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA: CHOOSING THE FUTURE (1981). 
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reducing crime, but also to reducing the prison population.8 This combina-
tion is certain to be immensely attractive to legislators, confronted with de-
mands to raise taxes to relieve prison congestion, and at the same time to 
"reduce" crime. Allen's observation that "at some point" an incapacitative 
policy (like deterrent policy) must "be countered by other principles" (p. 
76), although probably true, could be true only in the long run - about 
which Keynes said all that needs saying. And the "point" in time might be 
very far away if the dominance of the rehabilitative ideal be any example. 
I think there are good reasons to be especially concerned about incapac-
itation. There is no convincing sign that we are about to give up imprison-
ment, notwithstanding much current talk about "corrections in the 
community." If we retain it as the central instrument for control of "dan-
gerous" criminals, the need will be - is - to construct a new rationale, 
given the current, and perhaps continuing, disaffection from the rehabilita-
tive ideal. What better rationale is available, particularly what rationale 
that does not require what Allen argues we have lost - namely, a belief in 
the capacity of our institutions to affect character and behavior? None, I 
think, and particularly none that is ironically so closely connected to the 
rehabilitative ideal itself, which, if weakened, is arguably not exhausted. 
"Rehabilitation" and "incapacitation" are, in some respects, the obverse 
sides of a single coin, as Allen recognizes but fails, to my taste, sufficiently 
to explore. The connection has been made clearer during the course of the 
dominance of the rehabilitative ideal. All of the major changes in adult 
penal treatment that were introduced with much fanfare in the first part of 
the twentieth century - probation, the indeterminate sentence, parole -
provide means for investigating the "character" of those convicted of crimes 
with a view to determining their recidivist potential, or for taking account 
of it.9 They were intended, perhaps, to facilitate trial of the rehabilitative 
arts; but they were also intended, and functioned (however ineffectively), to 
permit incapacitation, prolonged incapacitation, or re-incapacitation of 
those thought unlikely to profit from such rehabilitative trials, or who failed 
them. 10 
We have been pursuing a partially incapacitative "ideal" for a very long 
time under the banner of "rehabilitation." The current move in some 
places to make sentences more "determinate" may serve less to counteract 
this policy than to provide a vehicle for making it more systematic, while at 
the same time taking some account of pressures for limits (in the absence of 
8. See P. GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, supra note 7. 
9. This view is particularly that of Foucault in DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 
16-24, although he does not give special attention to early twentieth century developments. 
David Rothman does, and partially shares this view. See D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND 
CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1970). See 
also Foucault,About the Concept of the "Dangerous Individual" in 19th-Century Legal Psychia-
try, 1 INTL. J.L. & PSYCH. 1 (1978). 
10. For years observers of modem prisons have commented on the seeming senselessness 
of elaborate diagnostic and classification procedures, in the absence of meaningful rehabilita-
tive programs. Consider that their main use for long may have been to identify "accidental" 
offenders who didn't need to be incapacitated and ''born" offenders who did. We have, of 
course, developed a more sophisticated set oflabels in recent years. See, e.g., the vocabulary 
developed in P. GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, supra note 7. 
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strong sentiment for continued incarceration in most cases) and more 
equality. Put differently, what is currently emerging could be a refinement 
of the "rehabilitative ideal" as it has been understood by many, and applied 
(again, however ineffectively) in many, even most, places. This is an omi-
nous refinement insofar as it implies, as I think it does, the readiness of 
many to "come to terms" with our "lack of knowledge" about how to reha-
bilitate-that is, how to facilitate voluntary <,:onformance. Is such knowl-
edge really lacking? Or do we know, instead, that rehabilitation is bound, 
for many, to be a chimera without major changes in the wider society, the 
accomplishment of which seems too remote to disturb our whole lives over 
- which is what is required for major social change. In this mood, further 
to salve our troubled consciences, we may be ready to deny the capacity to 
change - and thus the liberty and personhood - of some members of the 
population (and they can be identified), while at the same time we are, 
more or less knowingly, letting stand the social conditions which make 
them incapable of changing. 
Allen's essays raise these kinds of thoughts in me. They raise difficult, 
troubling questions, questions that need answers. I think that other readers 
will have a similar experience. That is very much for a scholar to have 
done. 
